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HOW NOT TO THINK ABOUT "MANAGED CARE"
Jacob S. Hacker*
Theodore R. Marmor**
The claim of this Article is that the concept of "managed care," like many concepts
now prominent in commentary about medical care finance and delivery in the United
States, is incoherent and thus a barrier to useful analysis. To demonstrate this con-
clusion, we first discuss the managerial context in which managed care claims have
arisen and outline the diverse trends to which the category is regularly and confus-
ingly applied. We then suggest an alternative approach to characterizing recent
changes in medical care and show how this approach alters and deepens our under-
standing of recent economic and political developments. We conclude by arguing for
more neutral categories to make sense of past and projected developments in methods
of reimbursement, techniques of management, and organizational structures.
INTRODUCTION
The state of American health insurance has been a leading topic
on the national policy agenda for much of the past decade. In the
early 1990s, the political debate focused on two contentious goals:
the expansion of health insurance and the control of medical
costs.' Toward the beginning of the decade, the critical question
for health policy analysts-and the nation-was whether President
Clinton's ambitious proposal for universal coverage through
* Junior Fellow, Society of Fellows, Harvard University and Fellow, the North Ameri-
can Foundation. A.B. 1994, Harvard University; Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, Yale
University. Author of THE ROAD TO NOWHERE: THE GENESIS OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PLAN
FOR HEALTH SECURITY (1997).
** Professor of Public Policy and Management, School of Management, Yale Univer-
sity and Professor of Political Science, Yale University. A.B. 1960, Harvard University; Ph.D.
1966, Harvard University. Author of numerous books and articles on health care policy,
including THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE (2d ed. 1999).
We wish to thank Mark Peterson and Bill Sage for their thoughtful comments (without, of
course, implying that they endorse our argument) and Camille Costelli for her tireless assis-
tance. Lauren Dame deserves special mention. A lawyer and public health expert, she signed
on to help us with a handful of footnotes but ended up contributing to nearly every aspect
of this project. That she was able to guide two political scientists through the unfamiliar
world of legal citation is the ultimate measure of her professionalism and patience.
1. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Introduction to THE WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY COUN-
CIL, THE PRESIDENT'S HEALTH SECURITY PLAN, at v (1993) (asserting that President Clinton
took office determined to solve two related crises in health care: the first being "the growing
number of Americans who lacked the basic security of health insurance," and the second,
"the spiral in health spending that threatened to bankrupt the government and cripple
American industry").
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"managed competition" would be enacted.2 As the decade wore on
without much progress toward universal coverage, the debate
turned to the quality of health insurance for those who have it.
3
The rhetorical centerpiece shifted from "managed competition" to
"managed care," a blanket expression denoting a mix of changes in
private insurance that many Americans appear to view with anxiety
and even hostility.4 The new critical question that came to preoc-
cupy health policy analysts was how to make sense of the "managed
5
care revolution" and its future prospects.
The premise of our argument is that this question cannot be an-
swered as currently formulated. The very term "managed care"-
much like that ubiquitous reform phrase of the early 1990s,
"managed competition"%-is a confused assemblage of sloganeering,
2. See generallyJACOB S. HACKER, THE ROAD TO NOWHERE: THE GENESIS OF PRESIDENT
CLINTON'S PLAN FOR HEALTH SECURITY (1997).
3. See, e.g., Mark R. Chassin, Quality of Health Care (pt. 3), 335 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1060,
1060 (1996) (stating that in the 1960s, improving quality was discussed in terms of increas-
ing access to care for certain populations, while in the 1990s, quality seems to mean
marketplace competition and "report cards" on health plans); see also Steven A. Schroeder,
The Medically Uninsured-Will They Always Be With Us?, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1130, 1130
(1996) (lamenting that the issue of expanded medical insurance coverage "erupts onto the
national scene" only periodically, such as in 1993, and then disappears "back under-
ground").
4. See, e.g., RobertJ. Blendon et al., Understanding the Managed Care Backlash, HEALTH
AFT., July-Aug. 1998, at 80, 90-91 (reporting on survey findings that Americans who were
satisfied with their current health plan were still fearful that their managed care plans would
not provide care or pay for care in the future when they got sick); Jerome P. Kassirer, Man-
aging Managed Care's Tarnished Image, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 338, 338-39 (1997) (criticizing
the superficial public relations efforts by the American Association of Health Plans to im-
prove the public's opinion of "managed care" and suggesting that there is good reason for
the American public to be critical of managed care).
5. See, e.g., Harry P. Cain II, Privatizing Medicare: A Battle of Values, in MEDICARE AND
MANAGED CARE: A PRIMER FROM HEALTH AFFAIRS AND THE CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE
FOUNDATION 41, 42 (John K. Iglehart ed., 1999) (arguing that "[m]ost of us would agree
that a full-scale revolution is under way"); Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Health System in Transition:
Care, Cost, and Coverage, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 339, 339 (1997) (noting that the
growth in market-based contracting and the "ascendancy of managed care" have generated
substantial change in American medical care, and arguing that "[u]nanswered in the man-
aged care revolution is the means for financing care for the 41 million uninsured
Americans").
6. "Managed Competition" is a phrase originally coined by economist Alain Enthoven
in the early 1980s, which was then expounded as a theory and debated in the academic
literature over the next decade. See generally Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of
Managed Competition, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 24. The term came to be used in such a
variety of ways over the years, however, that in this 1993 article, Enthoven not only retraced
the development of his ideas but also explained in some detail what managed competition
was "not," stating that "[mianaged competition is not just the latest buzzword that anybody
should feel free to appropriate .... Managed competition is not just a grab bag of ideas that
sound good. It is an integrated framework that combines rational principles of microeco-
nomics with careful observation and analysis of what works." Id. at 45. In spite of Enthoven's
efforts to reclaim the phrase "managed competition," however, the term still suffers from
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aspirational rhetoric, and business school jargon that sadly reflects
the general state of discourse about American medical institutions.
Because "managed care" is an incoherent subject, most claims
about it will suffer from incoherence as well. Moreover, to incorpo-
rate "managed care" and other similar marketing terms into health
policy research is to presuppose answers to some of the most cru-
cial questions about the recent evolution of medical care in the
United States.
Our reflections on this topic fall under four headings. Part I
briefly discusses the context from which contemporary marketing
slogans about medical care have emerged. Part II turns to analysis
of the term "managed care" in particular and illustrates the quite
diverse trends to which the category is regularly and confusingly
applied. In attempting to clarify the different developments in
health insurance that "managed care" seems intended to capture,
we suggest in Part III what we hope is a constructive route for fur-
ther discussion of the topic. Part IV completes the circle by
returning to the original topic of the politics of health insurance
and posing some final questions in light of our discussion of the
language of medical insurance and management. Our overarching
argument is that analysts should shun industry-promoted slogans
and instead develop more precise and neutral conceptual tools
with which to evaluate changes in modern medicine's reimburse-
ment methods, managerial techniques, and organizational forms.
Not only do we think that analytic discussions would be improved
by greater clarity of this sort, but we also believe that any policy re-
sponse to recent developments would also benefit from a more
precise examination of the specific changes in American health
insurance that have fostered public concern and professional resis-
tance.
I. MEDICAL CARE AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE-SPEAK
The discussion of many of the major topics in modern medical
care is marked by fads, sloppiness, and confusion. Marketing hy-
perbole and managerial jargon, rather than careful consideration
multiple warring definitions and inherent contradictions. See THEOOO R R. MARMOR, UN-
DERSTANDING HEALTH CARE REFORM 170-72 (1994).
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of alternative claims, dominate contemporary reflections on the
management, cost, quality, and organization of medical care.'
Management commentary resembles a perpetual motion ma-
chine more than a stable source of carefully considered ideas. The
popular innovations of one period give way to the enthusiasms of
the next with hardly a pause. Each managerial fad is launched with
high hopes and inflated rhetoric and then abandoned, while many
of the promoters escape criticism for their hyperbolic marketing.
Cycles of enthusiasm are regularly followed by declarations of fail-
ure, and both allow fortunes to be made out of the selling of the
managerial equivalent of snake oil.
Health policy audiences will be familiar with some of the shifting
fashions in general managerial commentary over the past two dec-
ades. In the 1970s, Management by Objective (MBO) and Zero
Based Budgeting (ZBO) were the rage in corporate boardrooms,
non-profit offices, and government bureaus." In recent years, cor-
porate-speak has shifted to expressions like Total Quality
Management (TQM), Integrated Delivery Systems (IDS), and, in
the case of this symposium's focus, "managed care."9
In the 1970s, big was regarded as better. Politicians as well as
managers embraced larger scale operations. Good managers were
those who horizontally and vertically integrated firms, bureaus, and
organizations into ever larger conglomerations of functions and
product lines. The emphasis was on synergy, economies of scale,
coordination, and the unification of functions.'0 Then, within a few
years, one was encouraged to think that small was beautiful. Dives-
titure, devolution, decentralization, and specialization-these
became the watch words of managerial correctness, both public
and private."
Indeed, the sheer number of internal management models has
increased considerably over the past two decades, from simple hi-
erarchies with a strict division of labor to cooperative teams." The
favored models among managers and employees have ranged from
7. These arguments have been made elsewhere. See Theodore R. Marmor, Forecasting
American Health Care: How We Got Here and Where We Might Be Going, 23J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y
& L. 551, 562-64 (1998). A fuller statement of this critique can be found in Theodore R.
Marmor, Hope and Hyperbole: The Rhetoric and Reality of Managerial Reform in Health Care, 3J.
HEALTH SERV. RES. & POL'Y 62 (1998) [hereinafter Marmor, Hope and Hyperbole].
8. See Marmor, Hope and Hyperbole, supra note 7, at 62-63.
9. See id. at 63.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See generally ANDRZEJ A. HUCZYNSKI, MANAGEMENT GURUS: WHAT MAKES THEM
AND HOW TO BECOME ONE 11-58 (1996) (discussing various management models that have
emerged in the twentieth century).
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those emphasizing adversarial combat to those featuring bonding
mechanisms." From within these broader notions of organizational
design emerged a dizzying array of techniques-from 'just in time"
inventory management to statistical quality assurance.1 4 In contem-
porary discussions of quality in medical care, the much heralded
technical panaceas are "outcomes measurement," "integrated de-
livery systems," and "evidence-based medicine.
15
Expressions like "managed care," "integrated delivery systems,"
and "evidence-based medicine" are in some respects all slogans-
persuasively defined terms that imply success by their very use. We
do not, for example, routinely speak of "unmanaged care,"
"disintegrated delivery systems," or "non-evidence based medicine."
The relative absence of such categories suggests that the purpose
of terms like "managed care" is less to clarify than to convince, less
to illuminate what an organization is or does than to bolster em-
pirical claims and normative connotations that are neither self-
evident nor, in most cases, subject to critical scrutiny.
Of course, the claims and connotations are not always positive.
With the emergence of a backlash against recent developments in
private health insurance, "managed care" has in many quarters
mutated from a term of approval into one of opprobrium. 6 The
danger to coherent thought, however, is the same in either case.
The categories we use to understand and explain organizational
change should not prejudge its desirability, nor should they reflect
uncritically the aspirations or allegations of its critics or defenders.
Such categories should tell us about the structure, behavior, and
evolution of an organization, not whether it is good or bad, suc-
cessful or unsuccessful, benevolent or sinister. Precisely because
much of the language used to describe American medical care to-
day is meant to persuade rather than explain, even thoughtful




14. See Marmor, Hope and Hyperbole, supra note 7, at 63.
15. Id.
16. See generally GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH: HMOs AND THE BREAK-
DOWN OF MEDICAL TRUST (1996) (detailing problems with health care that have arisen from
managed care plans); MICHAEL E. MAKOVER, MISMANAGED CARE: How CORPORATE MEDI-
CINE JEOPARDIZES YOUR HEALTH (1998) (providing extensive criticism of managed care);
Robert Kutmer, Must Good HMOs Go Bad? (pts. 1 & 2), 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1558, 1635
(1998).
17. Consider, for example, a recent article written by Rend Bowser and Lawrence 0.
Gostin entitled Managed Care and the Health of a Nation, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209 (1999). The
authors state, for example, that there is a "trend toward managed care." Id. at 1212. Man-
aged care is analogized with capitation, a payment method by which medical providers are
SUMMER 19991
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II. MANAGED CARE: FURTHER DISCUSSION,
ADDITIONAL CONFUSION
By adopting the marketing jargon of corporate medical care,
analysts risk adding credence to the claims and associations that
come with it. Yet there is an additional, and in many ways more
serious, risk posed by unreflective reliance on persuasive defini-
tions like "managed care": that analysts will fail to understand the
very organizational developments they seek to explain. For con-
temporary medical jargon not only embodies questionable claims;
it also prevents us from identifying or understanding what is dis-
tinctive about recent organizational changes. Nothing illustrates
this better than the ubiquitous term "managed care."
The expression "managed care" came into widespread use only
in the past decade.'i A revealing sign of its ascendance was the de-
cision of the American Medical Care and Review Association, an
insurance industry group founded in 1971, to rename itself the
American Managed Care and Review Association in 1989.' 9 The
term "managed care" does not appear once in Paul Starr's exhaus-
tive 1982 history of American medical care, The Social Transformation
of American Medicine,52 nor can it be found in other books on Ameri-
can health policy written before the early 1980s, including Lawrence
Brown's classic 1983 work on the Health Maintenance Organization
Act of 1973.21 As recently as 1989, in fact, newspapers were publish-
ing stories that introduced and explained the new development
called "managed care. 2 2 In the New York Times, the phrase first ap-
peared in 1985, but it surfaced in only a handful of articles during
paid a fixed amount to treat an individual patient regardless of the volume of services deliv-
ered. See id. at 1221. This payment method, the authors argue, creates incentives for plans to
promote behavior that reduces health risks and to emphasize preventive services, two favor-
ite industry claims. See id. at 1212-13. Thus the trend toward managed care should improve
the "health of the nation." Id. at 1294. Surely all these are common assertions made by pro-
ponents of prepaid capitated health plans. Surely, too, if every step of this familiar syllogism
were true, the final claim might well be true. The point is that we do not know if the steps of
the argument are true. Gostin and Bowser simply assume that they are.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 19-23.
19. The Association later merged with the Group Health Association of America to
form the American Association of Health Plans. See American Association of Health Plans,
New Association Announces Name and Philosophy of Care (visited Sept. 1, 1999)
<http://www.aahp.org/services/communications/media/1996/name.htm> (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
20. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).
21. See LAWRENCE D. BROWN, POLITICS AND HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION: HMOs AS
FEDERAL POLICY (1983).
22. See Victor Cohn, Someone Besides You and the Doctor May Be Deciding How You Get
Treated: Welcome to Managed Care, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1989, at Z12.
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the late 1980s. In the 1990s, however, articles mentioning the
phrase exploded, increasing from twenty-seven in 1990 to 287 in
1994 and 597 in 1998.23 Because "managed care" has become such
a commonly used and widely recognized expression, it is difficult
to recognize just how recently it entered the mainstream of Ameri-
can discourse.
From the beginning, "managed care" was a category with a
strong ideological edge, employed to imply competence, concern,
and, above all, control over a dangerously unfettered health insur-
ance structure. "Managed care," as the executive vice president of
the American Managed Care and Review Association stated in
1989, was an alternative "to the unbridled fee-for-service non-
system" that sent "blank checks to hospitals, doctors, dentists, etc."
and led to "referrals of dubious necessity" and "unmanaged and
uncoordinated care ... of poor or dubious quality. 2 4 As these
words indicate, managed care was portrayed less as a means to con-
trol patient behavior than as a way to bring doctors and hospitals in
line with perceived economic realities. Moreover, managed care
promised not only cost-control but also coordination and coopera-
tion, not only better management but also better care.23 By
imposing managerial authority on an anarchic "non-system," man-
aged care would simultaneously restrain costs and rationalize an
allegedly archaic structure of medical care finance and delivery.
What exactly constitutes "managed care," however, has never
been made clear, even by its strongest proponents.2" To some, the
crucial distinguishing feature is a shift in financing from indem-
nity-style fee-for-service, in which the insurer is little more than a
bill-payer, to capitated payment, in which medical providers are
23. Results are based on a search using the keywords "managed care" in LEXIS, News
Library, NY Times File.
24. Cohn, supra note 22, at Z12.
25. See, e.g., Karen Ignagni, Covering a Breaking Revolution: The Media and Managed Care,
,HEALTH AFF.,Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 26, 27 (describing managed care as a "system of care whose
goal is to offer superior coverage, state-of-the-art care, unprecedented accountability, and an
unparalleled commitment to continuous quality improvement-all at an affordable cost").
26. See, e.g., ELLEN FREUDENHEIM, HEALTHSPEAK: A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF AMER-
ICA'S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 155 (1996) (defining managed care as "a comprehensive
approach to health care delivery that encompasses planning and coordination of care, pa-
tient and provider education, monitoring of care quality, and cost control");JosEPH C. RHEA
ET AL., THE FACTS ON FILE DICTIONARY OF HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT 376-77 (1988)
(defining managed care as "health insurance plans that reduce unnecessary health care
costs by way of increased beneficiary cost sharing, controls on inpatient admissions and
lengths of stay, the establishment of cost-sharing incentives for outpatient surgery, selective
contracting with health care providers, and the direct management of high-cost health care
cases"); STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 283 (26th ed. 1995) (defining managed care as
"an arrangement whereby a third-party payer ... mediates between physicians and patients,
negotiating fees for service and overseeing the types of treatment given").
SUMMER 1999]
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paid a fixed amount to treat an individual patient regardless of the
volume of services delivered.2 ' However, there is nothing intrinsic
in fee-for-service payment that requires open-ended reimburse-
ment or passive insurance behavior.8 Conversely, many, if not
most, health insurance plans labeled "managed care" do not rely
primarily on capitation. 2" To other proponents, the distinctive
characteristic is the creation of administrative protocols for review-
ing and sometimes denying care demanded by patients or medical
professionals.30 Such micro-level managerial controls are likewise
not universal among so-called managed care health plans. 31 In fact,
such controls may be obviated by particular payment methods, like
capitation or regulated fee-for-service reimbursement, that create
more diffuse constraints on medical practice. Finally, to some, what
distinguishes managed care is its reliance on "integrated" networks
of health professionals from which patients are required to obtain52
care. Yet some self-styled managed care plans have no such net-
works, and what is called a network by many plans is little more
than a list of providers willing to accept discounted fee-for-service
27. See, e.g., Michael A. Morrisey, Introduction to MANAGED CARE AND CHANGING
HEALTH CARE MARKETS 1, 3 (Michael A. Morrisey ed., 1998) ("The term [managed care]
has taken on a variety of meanings. To some it means capitation; providers are paid a fixed
amount per subscriber for all or some well-defined component of their care.").
28. "Fee-for-service" is a system of reimbursement in which a medical provider charges
a patient (or third-party payer) a specific price for a specific service. See MARMOR, supra note
6, at 260.
29. See Marsha R. Gold et al., A National Survey of the Arrangements Managed-Care Plans
Make with Physicians, in CONTEMPORARY MANAGED CARE: READINGS IN STRUCTURE, OPERA-
TIONS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 101, 108 (Marsha R. Gold ed., 1998) [hereinafter
CONTEMPORARY MANAGED CARE]. This study, which examined 108 health maintenance
organizations and preferred provider organizations, found that capitation was the predomi-
nant method of payment for primary care physicians in only 37% of plans and the
predominant method of payment for specialists in just 18% of plans. See id.; see also Richard
Haugh, Son of Capitation, Hosp. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Jan., 1999, at 38 (pointing out that
"[o]nly about 5 percent of hospitals are paid capitated rates.... About a third [of doctors]
have capitated contracts... and they account for less than a quarter of doctors' revenue").
For a definition of "capitation," see supra text accompanying note 27.
30. See, e.g., Mark J. Schlesinger et al., Medical Professionalism Under Managed Care: The
Pros and Cons of Utilization Review, HEALTH AFF.,Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 106, 109 ("[T]hird-party
authorization of medical decisions perhaps most clearly embodies what many physicians fear
about managed care: its intrusiveness into clinical settings and its potential for inappropri-
ately standardizing treatment practices.").
31. See id. at 113.
32. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, EMPLOYMENT AND HEALTH BENEFITS: A CONNECTION
AT RISK 339 (Marilyn J. Field & Harold T. Shapiro eds., 1993) (defining managed care as a
term used "more narrowly to identify group or network based health plans that have explicit
criteria for selecting providers and financial incentives for members to use network provid-
ers"); see also Morrisey, supra note 27, at 3; Jonathan P. Weiner & Gregory de Lissovoy, Razing
a Tower of Babel: A Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health Insurance Plans, 18 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 75, 89 (1993).
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payments-hardly the dense coordination and integration that in-
dustry insiders routinely celebrate.33
Perhaps the most defensible interpretation of "managed care" is
that it represents a fusion of two functions that once were regarded
as largely separate: the financing of medical care and the delivery
34
of medical services. This interpretation, at least, provides a rea-
sonably accurate description of the most familiar organizational
entity that marched under the managed care banner until the late
1980s: the health maintenance organization (HMO), a successor to
the pre-paid group practice plans that began in the 1930s. 35 When
the vast majority of American health insurers used fee-for-service
payment and placed few restrictions on patient or provider discre-
tion, it was at least possible to identify a small subset of renegade
health plans that existed outside this insurance mainstream, how-
ever poorly the expression "managed care" described the
organization of such plans or what they did.
Today, however, that is no longer the case. In 1997, according to
estimates of the Health Insurance Association of America, only two
percent of private health plans conformed to the traditional model
of fee-for-service indemnity insurance. 36 Another sixteen percent
used fee-for-service payment but employed some form of utilization
review.37 Thus, between eighty and ninety-eight percent of today's
33. According to the Health Insurance Association of America, preferred provider or-
ganizations (PPOs) made up roughly half of all health insurance plans in the United States
in 1995, up from 28% in 1992. See HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, SOURCE
BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 59 tbl.3.1 (1998). By the Association's definition, "PPOs
contract with networks of providers to offer medical services according to a negotiated, dis-
counted, fee schedule." Id. at 52.
34. See, e.g., Peter D. Jacobson, Legal Challenges to Managed Care Cost Containment Pro-
grams: An Initial Assessment, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 1999, at 69, 72 (pointing out that health
insurance litigation under managed care differs from traditional health insurance litigation
because "with the integration of financing and care delivery under managed care, refusing
coverage means denying care altogether"); see a/soJames C. Robinson, The Future of Managed
Care Organization, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 7 ("For the past fifteen years the words
,managed care' have been the shorthand label for a wide variety of health plans that...
have combined the functions of delivering and financing medical care.").
35. See STARR, supra note 20, at 320-27 (describing the growth of prepaid group prac-
tice after 1945). Traditional HMOs such as Kaiser-Permanente of California and the Group
Health Cooperative of Puget Sound employed their own salaried doctors, operated their
own medical facilities, and charged subscribers a fixed fee per month regardless of the vol-
ume of services delivered. Not only did they operate quite differently from most other
insurers, they were not run by conventional insurance companies. See id. Most "managed
care" plans today, however, are operated by insurers such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield; and
very few are "staff-model" plans like Kaiser-Permanente and Group Health Cooperative.
Only 15 "staff-model" plans existed in 1997. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF HEALTH PLANS,
MANAGED CARE FACTS 2 (1998).
36. See HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 33, at 58 fig.3.7.
37. See id.
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private health insurers appear to fall into the broad category of
managed care. "Managed care" therefore does not offer any guid-
ance as to how to distinguish among the vast majority of
381
contemporary health plans.
The standard response to this problem has been to subdivide
the managed care universe into a collage of competing acronyms,
most coined by industry executives and marketers: HMOs, Pre-
ferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), and Exclusive Provider
Organizations (EPOs), to name a few .9 This is the approach taken
by Jonathan Weiner and Gregory de Lissovoy in their frequendy
cited 1993 article, Razing a Tower of Babel: A Taxonomy for Managed
Care and Health Insurance Plans.4°
According to Weiner and de Lissovoy, "[w]hat usually distin-
guishes ... managed care plans from [plans] that are more
traditional is that there is a party that takes responsibility for inte-
grating and coordinating the financing and delivery of services
across what previously were fragmented provider and payer enti-
ties. '41 They proceed by dividing managed care into five mutually
exclusive types of plans: fee-for-service plans with utilization review
(what they call "managed indemnity plans" or MIPs), PPOs, EPOs,
open-ended HMOs (O/HMOs), and regular HMOs. 2 Weiner and
de Lissovoy propose a fairly complicated scheme for distinguishing
among these five plan types (reproduced in Table 1).43 A closer
examination of their scheme indicates, however, that there are ac-
tually just two crucial distinguishing features: (1) whether plans
require that patients see only certain specified medical providers
(EPOs and regular HMOs do, MIPs do not, and PPOs and
O/HMOs do but allow patients to receive care from providers out-
38. This is one reason why it makes little sense to claim, as does a 1997 Health Affairs
article, that "[m]anaged care isn't coming; it has arrived." Gail A. Jensen et al., The New
Dominance of Managed Care: Insurance Trends in the 1990s, HEALTH Arr., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at
125, 125. Perhaps it has, but one might reasonably ask what precisely "it" is or whether it
makes sense to lump together recent developments in American health insurance within a
single general category-especially because the article ignores any conceptual discussion of
what is meant by the term "managed care" itself.
39. See, e.g., Network-Based Health Plans Definitions (visited Sept. 1, 1999)
<http://www.aahp.org/services/consumer information/definitions/definit.htm> (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (containing definitions of Exclusive
Provider Organizations (EPOs), Foundations for Medical Care (FMCs), Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs) (which are further divided into Staff Model, Group Model, Network
Model and Independent Practice Association (IPA)), Medicare Health Care Prepayment
Plan (HCPP), Point-of-service (POS) options, preferred provider organization (PPO), Spe-
cialty HMOs, and Specialty PPOs).
40. Weiner & de Lissovoy, supra note 32.
41. Id. at 78.
42. See id. at 87.
43. See id.
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side the network with a penalty), and (2) whether physicians bear
financial risk.4  Thus, as Table 1 shows, a MIP is a plan that uses
utilization controls but does not have a network of providers. A
PPO is a plan that has a network but allows patients to opt out of it
for a price. An EPO is a PPO that does not allow opt-outs. An
O/HMO is a network plan that allows opt-outs but, unlike a PPO,
uses capitation. Finally, a regular HMO is a capitated network plan
that does not allow opt-outs. With the exception of MIPs, Weiner
and de Lissovoy dub all these plans "integrated delivery systems. 45
TABLE 1
WEINER AND DE LissovoY's TAXONOMY FOR
CATEGORIZING HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS
Type of Plan
Dimension FFS MIP PPO EPO O/HMO HMO
Sponsor Assumes -/+ -4+ -4+ -4+ - -
Financial Risk 
a
Intermediary Assumes +/- +/- +/- +/- + +
Financial Risk a
Physicians Assume . . . . + +
Financial Riskb
Restriction on - - +/- + +
Consumers Selection
of Provider'
Significant Utilization - + + + + +
Controls Placed on
Provider's Practice d
Plan Obliged to - - +/- + + +
Arrange for Care
Provision
44. They do only in HMOs, Weiner and de Lissovoy argue, because HMOs rely on
capitation. See id. at 88.
45. See id. at 90.
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Key--FFS: "traditional fee-for-service indemnity plan; MIP: managed indemnity plan; PPO:
preferred provider organization; EPO: exclusive provider organization; O/HMO: open-ended
health maintenance organization; HMO: health maintenance organization (including inde-
pendent practice association).
- absent; + present
a The left side of the slash reflects a plan where an employer purchases a full-premium benefit
from the insurer. The right side reflects a self-insured (or minimally insured) private plan or a
government plan where risk resides with the sponsor.
b Primary care physicians at a minimum, but may also involve other providers.
C In PPOs and O/HMOs, consumer's choice is limited through incentives and disincentives
rather than mandatory restrictions. They have the option to seek covered care from outside
the plan. The right side of the slash reflects care when this "out-of-plan" option is exercised.
d Usually defined as mandated "prior-authorization" for nonernergency hospitalization.
This taxonomy, if nothing else, conforms to popular usage. It
introduces a new and more comprehensible plan moniker-
open-ended HMOs-to substitute for the commonly used yet
confusing label point-of-service plan (POS).46 Otherwise, however,
it merely offers extended definitions of the most common labels
already used by industry actors and observers. Weiner and de Lis-
sovoy deserve credit for trying to simplify the jumble of marketing
slogans and acronyms that surround American health insurance,
but the complicated scheme they come up with does not so much
"raze a tower of Babel" as rehabilitate it.
To begin with, Weiner and de Lissovoy's scheme actually tells us
relatively little about each type of health plan. If a plan places fi-
nancial risk on sponsors, it may be a MIP, PPO, EPO, or even a
traditional fee-for-service plan.47 If it puts intermediaries at finan-
cial risk, it may be any of the plan types.48 If a plan is a "managed
care" plan, we know that it places "significant utilization controls"
on medical practice. 49 However, what these controls constitute
(besides hospital precertification, which Weiner and de Lissovoy
say is the threshold consideration) or how they might differ across
46. In a "point-of-service" health insurance plan, patients are financially rewarded for
using a limited group of providers but are permitted to seek out-of-network care at higher
cost. See MARMOR, supra note 6, at 265.
47. See Table 1, supra pp. 671-672.
48. See id.
49. See Weiner & de Lissovoy, supra note 32, at 89.
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plan types (if they in fact do) is left unspecified." We are told that
if a plan has a network of providers, it is an "integrated delivery
system, 51 but what integration means in this context is unclear,
especially because it is a characteristic apparently shared by all but
one of the managed care plan types.52 Why MIPs are not consid-
ered integrated medical systems is also unclear. After all, they are
counted as managed care plans,53 and, according to Weiner and de
Lissovoy's definition, the essence of managed care is the
"integration" and "coordination" of the financing and delivery of
medical care.'4 Virtually the only clear criterion in this scheme is
that if medical providers bear risk, then a plan is an HMO.55
And yet, even this distinction is problematic. Many different
types of health plans are experimenting with ways to shift risk onto
medical providers through payment methods, withholding ar-
rangements, and bonus schemes, as Weiner and de Lissovoy
themselves note.56 Virtually all health financing methods, even tax-
financed national health insurance, place some risk on providers.
The real distinctions are, first, how concentrated the risk is, and,
second, whether it is immediate or long-term. Salaried doctors
working for HMOs may face much less concentrated and immedi-
ate financial risks than those physicians who, despite arms-length
relationships to health plans, face financial penalties if they pro-
vide too much or too costly care to individual patients. Over time,
the salaried doctor's income will depend on the performance of
the HMO, but his individual treatment decisions may be relatively
unencumbered by financial concerns. Rather than classifying risk-
bearing as present or absent, it is far more instructive to identify
the locus of risk, which might range from all providers within a
geographic area (as in a national health insurance scheme with a
global budget) to a specific group of providers (such as an HMO's
medical group) to an individual professional (as in many of the
57most recently developed incentive schemes).
The central problem with Weiner and de Lissovoy's taxonomy-
and, indeed, with most contemporary commentary about health
insurance-is the tendency to confuse reimbursement methods,
managerial techniques, and organizational forms. For example,
50. See id. at 85, 89.
51. Id. at 89-90.
52. See id. at 90.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 88.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 88-89, 96.
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fee-for-service, a payment method, is regularly contrasted with
"managed care," presumably an organizational form. 8 In Weiner
and de Lissovey's taxonomy, MIPs are distinguished from tradi-
tional fee-for-service plans by their reliance on a particular
managerial technique, namely utilization review. in contrast, PPOs
and EPOs are distinguished from MIPs by their particular organiza-
tional form, namely their reliance on a network of participating
providers.! And HMOs are distinguished from all these plans by
their particular payment method, namely capitation.6'
The practice of conflating organization, technique, and incen-
tives leads to unnecessary confusion. It means that when we
contrast health plans we are often comparing them across incom-
mensurable dimensions. So, for instance, an HMO becomes by
definition more "managed" than a fee-for-service plan with utiliza-
tion review even when the latter uses much stricter controls on
individual treatment decisions. By conflating distinct characteris-
tics, we also are tempted to presume necessary relationships
between particular features of health plans (such as their payment
method) and specific outcomes that are claimed to follow from
these features (such as the degree of integration of medical fi-
nance and delivery). Finally, the desire to describe an assortment
of disparate plan features with a few broad labels encourages a wild
goose chase of efforts to come up with black-and-white standards
for identifying plan types. If a plan relies on capitation (a payment
method), it is an HMO; if it has a network (an organizational
form), it is an integrated medical system, and so on. As health
plans employ increasingly diverse payment methods and organiza-
tional forms, the search for the "essence" of a particular plan will
become all the more futile.
Another hallmark of the way we talk about health insurance to-
day is the conspicuous failure to distinguish among the
perspectives of different actors. The answers to such questions as
whether a health plan is integrated or coordinated, whether it
manages treatment decisions, and whether it imposes risk all de-
pend crucially on whose perspective (patient, provider, or
purchaser) we are assuming in making such assessments. A plan
that appears "integrated" to outside observers, combining the de-
livery and financing of care in a seamless package, may rightly
seem fragmented to patients who discover they have to endure
58. See id. at 76-80.
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complex authorization procedures and pick from a list of certified
providers scattered across a region. To an employer,
"management" of care may mean an administrator handling self-
insured claims; to a doctor, it may signify outside control over
medical decisions; and to a patient, it may denote restrictions on
the providers and services covered by a plan. This is not to suggest,
of course, that our judgments about health plans are entirely sub-
jective, but rather to indicate that blanket terms like
"management" or "coordination" are empty abstractions when
used without specifying who is managing or coordinating what, for
whom, and why.
Given the overlap among Weiner and de Lissovoy's categories
and the lack of clear distirctions between them, it is hard to know
what these plan types represent, except perhaps some elusive Pla-
tonic ideal never actually realized in practice. If these are simply
abstract ideal types, however, then there seems no reason why they
should conform to the messy categories that industry actors and
their promoters employ. For these categories, as we have seen,
manifestly fail to clarify the differences among plans. Instead, they
identify a hodgepodge of features that are rarely exclusive to any
one plan and vary nearly as much within plan types as across them.
We think there is a better alternative.
III. A REVISED CONCEPTION OF HEALTH
INSURANCE ORGANIZATION
In understanding the structure of health insurance, the crucial
relationship is between those who deliver medical care and those
who pay for it. Even a passive indemnity insurer stands between the
patient and the medical provider as a financial intermediary and
an underwriter of risk. Today, with risk shifting from insurers to
employers, and with financial intermediaries playing more of an
administrative role than in the past, the trilateral relationship is
more complex.2 Nonetheless, it still remains the locus of the in-
surance contract. To characterize this trilateral relationship, we
focus on three of its essential features: first, the degree of risk-
sharing between providers and the primary bearer of risk (whether
an insurer or a self-insured employer); second, the degree to which
administrative oversight constrains clinical decisions; and, third,
the degree to which enrollees in a plan are required to receive
62. SeeJacobson, supra note 34, at 71.
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their care from a specified roster of providers. As Figure 1 shows,
these three criteria create a three-dimensional space within which
alternative health plans can be arrayed. We have placed a few illus-
trative descriptions of health plans in this space, as well as
indicated where we think the federal Medicare program and most
other nations' universal health programs should be located.
FIGURE ONE
THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF HEALTH PLAN ORGANIZATION
Key
1. Traditional Blue Cross/Blue Shield indemnity insurance
2. National health insurance in most other advanced industrial democracies
3. Medicare
4. Indemnity insurance with utilization review
5. Typical PPO
6. Staff-model HMO
7. Future direction of private health plans?
Note: The circles indicate the placement of the health plans. The dotted lines are
included to aid in the location of the plans on the utilization review axis.
Our aim here is not to construct an exhaustive typology of
health plans, if that were even possible given the rapid pace of
change in American medical care. Rather, we wish to challenge the
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common way of thinking about how to classify health plans. Our
argument is that health plans differ across at least three principal
dimensions: risk-sharing between plan and provider, managerial
control of clinical decision-making, and limits on patient choice of
medical professional. Each dimension crucially affects the trilateral
connections among provider, patient, and plan. We also wish to
emphasize that there is no simple relationship between plan label
and the placement of a plan along these axes. Staff-model HMOs
may seem like the quintessence of "managed care," yet because
they place financial constraints at the group level they do not nec-
essarily concentrate as much risk on physicians as do other
network-based health plans, nor do they not necessarily entail as
much clinical regulation at the micro-level. Microregulation may
go hand in hand with restrictions on patient choice of provider,
but it also may not. Indeed, management of individual clinical de-
cisions and the creation of broad incentives for conservative
practice patterns may very well be alternative mechanisms for lower-
ing the cost of medical care. Finally, as recent developments in the
health insurance market suggest, greater risk-sharing can co-exist
with almost any set of arrangements. It does not require a closed
network, much less strict utilization review. Risk sharing is a prod-
uct of the payment methods and incentive structures that connect
risk-bearing agents and medical providers. It does not exclusively
occur in HMOs, nor does it require capitation.
Notice, too, that Figure 1 makes no mention of those popular
buzzwords "integration" and "coordination." Movement toward a
closed network, toward greater utilization control, or toward in-
creased risk-sharing can create the conditions under which
integration or coordination may occur." They do not imply, how-
ever, that such integrative activities actually take place. Getting the
right care to the right patient at the right time is a managerial ac-
complishment, not a product of labels.
Finally, the conventional fee-for-service versus capitation dichot-
omy does not remain a useful means of distinguishing among
different health plans. Instead, the crucial issue is what incentives
medical providers actually face. The particular mix of payment
63. For a general discussion of financial risk-sharing in health insurance, see Marsha R.
Gold et al., Behind the Cure: A Critical Assessment of How Little Is Known About Arrangements
Between Managed Care Plans and Physicians, in CONTEMPORARY MANAGED CARE, supra note 29,
at 86-89.
64. See generally Robert H. Miller, Health System Integration: A Means to an End, HEALTH
Asp., Summer 1996, at 92 (describing the variety of ways in which integration can occur in
health care and concluding that the results of integration-positive or negative--depend
upon the subsequent behavior of managers, physicians, and other actors).
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methods that create those incentives is less important and will un-
doubtedly change as health plans experiment with new
reimbursement modalities in the future.
Disaggregating health insurance into its constituent features not
only helps to clarify what health plans do and how they are struc-
tured, but it also makes it easier to identify the specific trends in
medical finance and delivery that are carelessly jumbled together
when we speak of such grand events as the "managed care revolu-
tion."65 Although we cannot provide a comprehensive empirical
survey in this context, our reading of the evidence leads us to be-
lieve that the developments of the past decade have not pushed
American health insurance in a consistent direction, much less to-
ward any single organized entity that might be labeled "managed
care.
Indeed, movement along these axes has been halting and incon-
sistent. Through roughly the late 1980s, an increasing number of
health plans moved toward closed networks.66 In the 1990s, by con-
trast, the trend has been toward intermediate levels of compulsion,
with formerly closed plans offering opportunities for patients to
opt out with a penalty and with new plans shying away from closed-
network structures.67 Utilization review was also fashionable during
the 1980s,68 yet it too has fallen somewhat into disfavor as plans
have moved toward greater reliance on plan-provider risk-sharing,
which in turn has become more focused at the level of the individ-
69
ual provider and individual service category over time. If there
65. See Thorpe, supra note 5, at 339; see also Ignagni, supra note 25, at 27 ("A revolution
is taking place in the organization and delivery of health care in the United States. Practi-
cally overnight, managed care has replaced fee-for-service as the nation's health care system
of choice.").
66. HMO enrollment grew at an annual rate of more than 20% in the mid-1980s, but
growth slowed to single digits in the late 1980s and early 1990s. See HEALTH INSURANCE AS-
SOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 33, at 51 fig.3.1.
67. Between 1993 and 1995, enrollment in fully closed plans grew by 22.8%, while en-
rollment in plans that allowed patients to exit the network for a price grew by 57%. See
Jensen et al., supra note 38, at 127. Traditional HMOs increased their coverage at less than
one-fifth the rate of HMOs that allowed patients to leave the network. See id.; see also Haugh,
supra note 29, at 38 ("Open-access plans are growing much faster than traditional
HMOs.... PPOs added 44 million members in the last five years, compared with the 30
million who joined HMOs. Even HMOs are adding point-of-service options. ... "); Ken
Terry, Hang On-The Ride's Going to Get Rougher, MED. ECON., Apr. 12, 1999, at 176-78.
68. Conventional fee-for-service insurance without utilization review declined from
40% in 1987 to 5% in 1990. See HACKER, supra note 2, at 15.
69. See Stephen A. Magnus, Physicians' Financial Incentives in Five Dimensions: A Concep-
tual Framework for HMO Managers, HEALTH CARE MGMT. RV., Winter 1999, at 57-58
(arguing that "the growing popularity of financial incentives may indicate that they are be-
coming the method of choice for influencing physician behavior"); Andrew J. Sussman et
al., PHOs and Risk: Aligning Incentives with Internal Subcapitation, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT.,
Aug. 1999, at 42, 42-46; Statistical Notes-Capitation Contracts Continue to Grow Among Both
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has been any general movement in the past two decades-and
surely there has been-it has been from the front-left-top portion
of the figure toward the back-right-bottom portion. Even this de-
velopment, however, has been neither consistent nor evenly paced.
In fact, the clearest and most unmistakable trend has been in the
direction of straightforward price-discounting, as plans have used
their market clout to selectively contract with physicians willing to
accept negotiated rates. This is an important development, but in
both international and historical perspective, it is hardly as un-
precedented as grand phrases like "the managed-care revolution"
imply.
IV. THE POLITICS OF A CONTESTED CATEGORY
If recent trends in the organization of American medicine re-
main elusive, the political responses to these changes are in some
ways fairly simple to describe. Driven in part by heart-wrenching
stories about the denial of care to sick and dying patients, scores of
states have enacted new health insurance regulations. Although
the motives for these laws have varied, most seem to reflect gener-
alized public fears about a perceived loss of control over medical
decision-making, as well as the specific complaints of both medical
professionals and patients about managerial and financial policies
that are alleged to encourage providers to deliver inadequate or
70substandard care.
In response to these trends, scores of states have introduced new
legislation to regulate health plans and protect "consumer rights."'"
Nearly all states have enacted at least one or two reforms, and
many have implemented several different reform packages.72 These
include protections for emergency room patients, 3 requirements
Physicians and Hospitals, HEALTH CARE STRATEGIC MGMT., May 1999, at 7 (stating that ac-
cording to an annual survey, Managed Care Indicator, conducted by Evergreen Re, both U.S.
hospitals and physicians are continuing to increase their numbers of capitated contracts,
and the trend to use capitation is likely to continue in the coming years).
70. See Blendon et al., supra note 4, at 81.
71. See FAMILIES USA FOUNDATION, THE BEST FROM THE STATES II: THE TEXT OF KEY
STATE HMO CONSUMER PROTECTION PROVISIONS passim (1998); FAMILIES USA FOUNDA-
TION, HIT AND MISS: STATE MANAGED CARE LAws passim (1998) [hereinafter FAMILIES USA
FOUNDATION, HIT AND MISS]; GERALDINE DALLEK ET AL., CENTER FOR HEALTH CARE
RIGHTS, CONSUMER PROTECTIONS IN STATE HMO LAws passim (1995).
72. See FAMILIES USA FOUNDATION, HIT AND MISS, supra note 71, at 2.
73. See Diane E. Hoffmann, Emergency Care and Managed Care-A Dangerous Combination,
72 WASH. L. REV. 315, 368-80 (1997) (describing state legislative efforts to protect emer-
gency room patients from problems caused by "managed care").
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of access to out-of-network providers,74 granting of direct access to
specialists for the seriously ill and to obstetricians and gynecologists
for women, 5 the creation of independent appeals processes for
76those denied care, the establishment of consumer assistance pro-
grams,77 the banning of gag clauses and "inappropriate" financial
incentives,7 s and, at the extreme, legislation permitting subscribers
to sue health plans."' By June of 1998, the majority of states had
passed more than one but fewer than five such protections.8" Not
surprisingly, the regulatory policies differ significantly from state to
state (although some changes, like emergency room protections,
are almost universal in states that have passed reforms) .8 As of
June 1998, South Dakota was the only state not to have passed any
of these regulatory reforms.82 On the other hand, only Missouri
and Texas had allowed enrollees to sue their health plans."
The ability of the states to regulate private health insurance is
constrained, however, by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974,84 which preempts most state regulations of self-insured
health plans (those in which employers pay medical claims them-
selves) and also precludes lawsuits seeking punitive or compensatory
damages against all employer-sponsored health plans. Only federal
regulations will thus reach the roughly fifty-one million Americans
covered by self-insured plans, and only federal laws can establish an
expanded right to sue for the more than 124 million Americans
covered by employment-based health plans. At the federal level,
however, the debate over regulatory protections stalled during
1998. The Clinton impeachment struggle dominated Washington
and distracted attention from health insurance reform. Moreover,
Democrats and Republicans were far apart on the appropriate leg-
islative responses to problems that many states had already
addressed. In 1999, however, a faction of House Republicans that
74. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-16-704(2) (1998).
75. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-49-4 (Supp. 1997).
76. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089f (Supp. 1998).
77. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 641.60(2) (1998).
78. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-4604 (Supp. 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.13-
3(B) (8) (Supp. 1998).
79. See, e.g., TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.001-.003 (West Supp. 1999).
80. See FAMILIES USA FOUNDATION, HIT AND Miss, supra note 71, at 4.
81. See id. at 5-7.
82. See id, at 4.
83. See id. at 19 ("Only two states-Texas and Missouri-have passed laws exempting
managed care corporations from their laws against suing corporations for malpractice. Only
Texas, however, has taken the additional step of creating a cause of action so individuals can
sue their health plans.").
84. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1974)).
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includes several Republican physicians endorsed a limited right to
sue, paving the way for compromise legislation in the House. s5 Al-
though the House proposal remains much broader than the
narrowly passed counterpart bill in the Senate, 6 it is nonetheless
striking that any legislation survived in the acrimonious Partisan
climate in Congress. This suggests the degree to which members of
both parties interpret public dissatisfaction with contemporary
health insurance developments as a potent political topic that
Democrats in particular can use on the campaign trail.
Although the broad contours of that debate are clear, the un-
derlying issues are not in our view deeply understood, even by
defenders of particular legislative solutions. As political scientists,
we wonder, for example, about the specific source of the pressure
for federal reform. One recent article attempts to measure the
depth of the managed care backlash 7 Its conclusion is hardly star-
ding: the backlash is real but not extremely deep, and
dissatisfaction is with the medical system as a whole rather than
with personal experiences with managed care health plans."" Many
have argued that managed care regulations are being promulgated
by doctors and nurses angry about challenges to their income and
autonomy. 9 It is not clear, though, that there is much evidence for
that claim at the national level. One wonders about how exactly
"the backlash" emerged and how it has changed; about how re-
formers decided on specific strategies and how they got so many
states to pass laws. The ground-level politics of the issue are simply
not well understood.90
Furthermore, as students of health policy, we have serious ques-
tions about the desirability and presumptions of some of the
proposed regulations. Divergent tendencies appear to be at work.
85. See Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 2723,
106th Cong. (1999) (sponsored by Rep. Charlie Norwood, passed 275-151 (roll no. 490) on
Oct. 7, 1999).
86. See Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act of 1999, S. 1344, 106th Cong. (1999)
(sponsored by Sen. Trent Lott, passed 53-47 (roll no. 210) onJuly 15, 1999). As of this writ-
ing (October 1999), it remains unclear what will emerge from the House-Senate conference
and whether the legislation produced will pass both houses and be sent to President Clinton
for his signature.
87. See generally Blendon et al., supra note 4.
88. See id. at 90.
89. See, e.g., E. Clarke Ross, Regulating Managed Care: Interest Group Competition for Control
and Behavioral Health Care, 24J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 599, 600-07 (1999).
90. There have, however, been some attempts to understand these issues. See, e.g.,
Eugene Declercq & Diana Simmes, The Politics of "Drive-Through Deliveries": Putting Early Post-
partum Discharge on the Legislative Agenda, 75 MILBANK Q. 175, 182-97 (1997) (analyzing the
process by which the issue of early hospital discharge of mothers and new babies moved
quickly onto the agenda of decision makers and resulted in new state laws).
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One the one hand, between 1993 and 1998, many commentators
celebrated the health insurance industry's apparent achievements
in controlling costs.9' On the other, few seemed to like how the in-
dustry controlled costs.9 2 The two positions appear, if not to
contradict one another, at least to call into serious question the
sustainability of a lowered rate of medical inflation into the next
century. Similarly, the push to regulate health plans appears at
odds with the popular goal of increasing coverage. Almost every
analyst acknowledges that new restrictions will increase costs, thus
93
reducing rates of coverage. The push for regulation does seem to
be a distinctly American response-a juridical-regulatory style of
policy intervention that brings in government through the back
door and deals in the language of rights rather than in broader
issues of social allocation.94
Although aggressive regulation of private institutions is a recur-
rent strain in American politics, however, it runs sharply against
the grain of recent national policy developments. After the failure
of the Clinton health plan in 1994 and the subsequent election of a
Republican Congress, congressional leaders sought to ease regula-
tions on a wide range of industries, including the private medical
sector. Along with maverick Democrats like Senator John Breaux,
they also attempted to incorporate a greater role for private health
insurance within. Medicare, with the ultimate goal of replacing
America's federal health insurance program for the aged with a
system of competing private health plans.
The rise of "managed care regulation" as a leading political issue
indicates that the unbridled enthusiasm for private cost-
containment that motivated these efforts has waned considerably.
At the same time, it highlights many of the unresolved contradic-
tions inherent in recent public policy. Private health plans have
perhaps never been more celebrated by American policymakers as
the appropriate means for providing health coverage. Yet dissatis-
faction with the specific practices of private health plans has
probably never been greater either. Indeed, even as state and fed-
eral politicians have actively shifted beneficiaries of government
health insurance programs into private health plans, they have
91. See, e.g., Morrisey, supra note 27, at 1.
92. See generally ANDERS, supra note 16.
93. See e.g., Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate: S. 6, Patients' Bill of Rights Act of
1999 (last modified Apr. 23, 1999) <http://www.cbo.gov> (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
94. See Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, 10 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 369, 369 (1991).
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loudly criticized such plans for overriding patient and provider
preferences or delivering substandard care.
Although policymakers have directed much of their regulatory
ire at the broad (and hazily defined) target of "managed care,"
much of the legislative momentum thus far has been toward the
passage of specific, piecemeal responses to particularly salient
complaints. The regulatory reaction reflects undeniable dissatisfac-
tion, to be sure, but this dissatisfaction seems to be with selected
features of the changing health insurance market, not with a
clearly understood world of "managed care." Indeed, what ulti-
mately seems to underlie recent state and federal activity is a more
fundamental tension in U.S. health policy, between a national
health insurance strategy that relies heavily on nongovernmental
institutions, on the one hand, and the understandable desire to
alter the behavior of these putatively private institutions when they
fail to meet public expectations, on the other.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that a striking feature of the discussion of
American managed care is its linguistic confusion. Both political
actors and medical commentators regularly trade in persuasive
definitions and stylized facts, the truth or falsehood of which re-
main unproven. The use of the term "managed care" exemplifies
this practice and illustrates how many unanswered questions it
leaves. What are the essential features of managed care, if any?
How does it differ from indemnity-style, fee-for-service health in-
surance? How does it differ from insurance plans that just rely on
utilization review? Are plans we label "managed care" more differ-
ent from traditional fee-for-service insurance than they are from
one another? Simply put, a sensible discussion of managed care-
much less a determination of the appropriate means by which to
regulate it-requires that we know what is being discussed.
The starting point for improved discussion and analysis is the
acknowledgment that many of the categories we are accustomed to
employing are essentially slogans used for self-promotion by vari-
ous actors in contemporary American medicine. In that respect,
they are appropriate objects of study in their own right, but they
are not analytical terms that can frame our investigations, at least
not without considerable further specification.
Once we address specific features of health insurance, moreo-
ver, the category "managed care" itself becomes ambiguous. The
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"managed care revolution" is really a set of related trends, few of
which are accurately captured by the blanket term. When these
trends are distinguished from one another, the evidence suggests
that American health insurance has moved simultaneously in sev-
eral different, perhaps even contradictory, directions in recent
years and that many of the changes are longer standing than the
rhetoric of managed care implies. This does not mean that the re-
cent interest in regulating private health insurance is misguided or
unfounded. It is only to emphasize that demands for regulation are
motivated by a constellation of related but distinct changes in
American health insurance that are not accurately described by the
generalized expression "managed care." To date, moreover, state
and federal policymakers have largely advocated targeted and
piecemeal regulatory measures designed to alter particular features
of private health plans-features that are deemed undesirable
quite apart from their association with the broader label of
"managed care."
The rapid changes taking place in American medical care im-
pose a special burden on analysts to be precise about the criteria
and considerations that underlie their empirical evaluations and,
ultimately, their judgments and assessments. Labels and categories
are indispensable, but they should be designed to elucidate the
techniques, organizational forms, and incentives that characterize
alternative health plans, rather than to confirm or deny the claims
of industry friends or foes. The term "managed care" fails that test,
and although we hardly expect our words to be heeded (especially
since both of us have reluctantly used the term in our own writ-
ings), we think that it and other terms like it should be banished
from the health care lexicon for good.
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